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Abstract 
With agriculture occupying approximately sixty per cent of Australia’s land surface, policy makers, 
scientists  and  land  managers  are  becoming  increasingly  interested  in  opportunities  to  sequester 
greenhouse emissions through land use change. The announcement of the Labor Government’s Carbon 
Farming Initiative brings Australian agriculture a step closer to participating in recognised domestic 
and international climate change mitigation action. In this paper, the costs and opportunities for carbon 
sequestration  options  under  the  Carbon  Farming  Initiative  are  assessed.  The  following  section 
discusses  the  substantial  hidden  costs  that  may  be  associated  with  an  offset  trading  scheme  and 
potential  for  these  costs  to  substantially  shrink  the  size  of  the  market.  The  paper  concludes  by 
presenting some potential solutions to the challenges raised and identifies some critical questions for 
policy makers.  
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Introduction 
It is now generally recognised that man made greenhouse gas emissions are contributing to climate 
change.  Politically,  this  recognition  manifested  in  2009  at  COP15  in  the  Copenhagen  Accord,  a 
commitment from developing and developed countries to limit the global temperature increase to 2°C. 
Under the Copenhagen Accord, Australia committed to a reduction of five per cent below 2000 levels 
regardless of the actions of other countries, and up to 25 per cent below 2000 levels given strong global 
commitment to mitigation.  
In 2008, direct emissions from the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery sectors totalled 120 Mt C02-e, 
accounting for over 20 per cent of national direct emissions (DCCE 2010). Through sequestration or 
changes in farm and forestry management there is strong potential to substantially reduce the emission 
profile of the agriculture and forestry sectors, and the Australian economy more generally.  
Offset  trading  schemes  have  been  proposed  and  implemented  as  effective  policies  to  reduce 
agricultural emissions. For example, the state of Alberta in Canada has an operating agricultural offset 
scheme and offsets have long been part of the Kyoto Protocol. An offset trading scheme allows carbon 
credits to be generated through sequestration or carbon abatement. Once verified, that credit can then 
be traded in domestic or international markets, thereby creating new income streams for farmers and 
landholders.  
At present, the two domestic policies driving potential abatement within Australia’s agriculture and 
forestry sectors are the National Carbon Offset Standard (NCOS) and the Carbon Farming Initiative 
(CFI).  At  the  conceptual  level,  the  NCOS  is c l a s s i f i e d  a s  a  v o l u n t a r y  o f f s e t  i n  A u s t r a l i a .  I t  s e t s  
minimum requirements for the verification and retirement of voluntary carbon credits and provides 
guidance to calculate the carbon footprint of an organisation or product in order to encourage ‘carbon 
neutrality’. NCOS established the Carbon Neutral Program, which replaced the Greenhouse Friendly 
Program and enables Australian organisations and products to be certified as carbon neutral. 
The draft legislation for the CFI was released in in January 2011. Once legislated, the CFI represents 
the most significant opportunity for agricultural offsets in Australia, as it will provide a mechanism for 
agriculture and forestry offsets to be created and sold to domestic and international markets.  
One of the great attractions of agricultural offsets is their potential to facilitate a wide range of low cost 
mitigation activities. However, there is a risk that these low cost mitigation activities may be eroded 
away by the significant transaction costs associated with accounting, monitoring and verifying carbon 
abatement in the agricultural sector.  
In this paper, the costs and opportunities for carbon sequestration options under the CFI are assessed. 
The  following  section  discusses  the  substantial  hidden  costs that  may be associated with an offset 
trading scheme and potential for these costs to substantially shrink the size of the market. The paper 
concludes by presenting some potential solutions to the challenges raised and identifies some critical 
questions for policy makers.  
The Carbon Farming Initiative 
The CFI draft legislation was released in early 2011 and is expected to be admitted to Parliament in the 
first half of 2011.  
The CFI will be designed to run in parallel to the NCOS, which was introduced in July 2010. While the 
NCOS will establish the rules for companies to either sell carbon neutral products or become carbon 
neutral themselves, the CFI will provide farmers and landowners with guidelines on what activities and 
methods can generate carbon credits.   
  3 
The CFI will facilitate the creation of two different types of offsets: Kyoto-compliant offsets and non-
compliant voluntary offsets. Kyoto-compliant offsets will be credited to emission reductions that can 
be counted towards Australia’s (or another country’s) international emission target. As such, Kyoto-
compliant offsets will need to comply with international accounting rules. Emission reductions that do 
not contribute to Australia’s international emission reduction commitments may also generate offsets 
to  be  sold  into  voluntary  markets.  The  different  types  of  offset  permits  and  potential  markets  are 
illustrated in Figure 1.1 
Figure 1.1  
CFI OFFSET PERMITS 
 
Source: DCCEE, 2010. 
Quantifying abatement and available technologies 
The agricultural offset market is essentially a new market into which farmers can sell abatement (or 
other reduction activities) without the obligation to accept any emission reduction constraints, and is 
therefore a key opportunity for Australia’s agricultural sector.  
The  CFI  has  been  designed  to  be  deliberately  broad  to  maximise  the  opportunities  for  carbon 
abatement.  As  discussed, b o t h  K y o t o  c o m p l i a n t  e m i s s i o n  r e d u c t i o n s  t h a t  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  A u s t r a l i a ’ s  
international commitments and non-compliant emission reductions that can be sold into domestic and 
international voluntary markets can be created under relevant methodologies and specific accounting 
rules.  
The established technologies and practices that may be used to produce Kyoto compliant offsets — 
subject to the development of accounting methodologies — include: 
•  increased efficiency of fertiliser application; 
•  sequestration through reforestation; 
•  manure management in intensive livestock production; 
•  improved feedstock quality; 
•  switching to rice varieties with reduced methane production; 
•  improved savannah fire management; and 
•  avoided deforestation.   
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The abatement potential of each of these technologies and processes will differ both between farm 
products and across agricultural regions. It is beyond the scope of this article to go into detail regarding 
the scientific potential for emission reductions in the agricultural sector. However, to understand the 
scale  of  emission  reductions  that  are  possible,  the  potential  abatement  from  three  activities  are 
discussed below. 
Reducing emissions from enteric fermentation in livestock  
The level of methane produced by an animal depends primarily on the animal’s digestive system and 
the amount and type of feed (Ford et al. 2009). It is estimated that between five and 15 per cent of 
dietary energy is lost from the farm system as methane (AGO 2005; Avcare 2003). Methane emissions 
from  livestock  can  be  reduced  by  increasing  animal  productivity,  improving  feed  conversion 
efficiency, bioengineering and improved livestock and feed management.  
The University of Melbourne (2008) estimated that using feed that is more easily digested (such as 
perennial ryegrass or white clover pasture) can improve milk production while reducing emissions per 
unit of output by up to 50 per cent. Further research has suggested that the addition of unsaturated fatty 
acids to animal feed can reduce emissions by up to 40 per cent (University of Melbourne 2008). The 
use of rumen modifiers such as antibiotics and tannins has also proven to reduce emissions by 25 per 
cent. However, as discussed in Ford et al. (2009), such emission reductions may be temporary and 
there  is  uncertainty  regarding  consumer  preferences  for  meat  that  has  been  produced  using  such 
modifiers.  
Reducing emissions from manure management 
Emissions stemming from the decomposition of manure depend strictly on the amount of  manure 
produced, temperature, moisture levels and the types and lengths of storage (Ford et al 2009).  
There are a number of activities that can be implemented to reduce emissions associated with livestock 
production. Practices include: administration of anti-methanogens, improving feed quality, livestock 
breeding and the use of anaerobic digesters. Anaerobic digesters break down manure under anaerobic 
conditions to produce a biogas and a nutrient-rich fertiliser. Such digesters have been estimated to 
reduce emissions by between 50 and 75 per cent (Bates 2001; DeAngelo et al. 2003). It should be 
noted that the application of such abatement techniques and practices  will be limited in extensive 
rangeland production systems. 
Reducing emissions from agricultural soils 
Article 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol also identifies agricultural soil-based sinks as a further mechanism 
for  countries  to  meet  their  emissions  reduction  commitments  (Kyoto  Protocol,  1997).  However, 
Australia is not a signatory of Article 3.4 (due to uncertainties surrounding the flow of emissions from 
agricultural  soils)  and therefore  soil  carbon  cannot  contribute  to  Australia’s  international  emission 
reduction  commitments.  That  said,  there  are  opportunities  for  farmers  to g e n e r a t e  a n d  s e l l  n o n -
compliant offset credits into domestic and international voluntary markets.  
A range of management practices can be implemented to increase soil carbon. Given robust accounting 
methodologies, current technologies or practices that could be used to generate voluntary offset credits 
include increased use of no-till farming, reduced fallow periods, application of biochar, switching to 
deep rooted pasture crops, improved grazing regimes, and conversion of cropland to perennial grazing 
vegetation (Calford et al., 2010). 
There  is  much  uncertainty  and  debate,  particularly  within  Australia,  as  to  the  total  potential  of 
agricultural  soils  to  store  additional  carbon,  the  rate  at  which  soils  can  accumulate  carbon,  the 
permanence of this sink, and how best to monitor changes in soil organic carbon stocks (Sanderman et 
al., 2010). Current estimates range between 0.1 to 0.6 Mg C per hectare per annum. For a detailed 
analysis of the latest science regarding soil carbon sequestration see Bruce et al. (2010) and Sanderman 
et al. (2010). Both studies stress the importance of increased research to understand the processes of 
carbon sequestration in agricultural soils and subsequent development of accounting methodologies.   
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Cost of agricultural and forestry based abatement  
The abatement potential of the agricultural and forestry sectors is a strategic issue for the industries 
themselves  to  investigate.  Agricultural  emissions  are  spread  over  a  range  of  activities,  each  with 
different opportunities and costs associated with emission reductions.  
Essentially, an offset market introduces a new commodity that farmers will need to consider in their 
product mixes. As discussed by Campbell and Barber (2010), in the same way that a farmer chooses 
between crops and livestock, with an operating offset scheme they will need to consider the costs and 
benefits of producing a given amount of carbon. To make efficient decisions, they will require clear 
information regarding the cost of different abatement methodologies and the expected revenue from 
permit sales.  
The  potential  cash  benefits  that  might  flow  to  the  agriculture  and  forestry  from  land-based offset 
arrangements are unclear. Critically, benefits will depend on the interaction of demand and supply and 
the prevailing carbon price and the cost of mitigation activities. The cost of abatement projects is likely 
to vary both between agricultural activities and agricultural regions (Gunasekera et al., 2007). Further, 
the timeframe over which emission reductions are credited and the relationship between stocks and 
flows of greenhouse gases will also affect the feasibility and cost of abatement activities.  
One of the attractions of agricultural offsets lies in the evidence that there may exist a wide range of 
abatement opportunities that could be achieved at minimum or no cost and could possibly result in an 
increase in farm revenue (Ford et al. 2009, Gunasekera et al. 2007; Campbell and Barber 2010, Allen 
Consulting Group 2006). These are referred to as ‘no-regrets’ opportunities, as they increase farm 
profit while reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  
A key source of ‘no-regrets’ opportunities is thought to be mitigation of methane and nitrous oxide 
emissions. Methane and nitrous oxide emissions indicate residual energy being expelled from farm 
systems. Better targeting of feed and fertiliser application could result in improved farm efficiency, 
reduced operating costs and reduced greenhouse emissions (Campbell and Barber 2010). For example, 
in some instances reduced fertiliser application can increase yields,  while reducing input costs and 
greenhouse  emissions.  Other  examples  of   ‘ no-regrets’ a b a t e m e n t  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  i n c l u d e  m i n i m u m -
tillage cropping and improved grazing regimes.  
However, t h e r e  i s  u n c e r t a i n t y  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  e l i g i b i l i t y  o f  ‘ n o -regrets’  abatement.  Under  an  offset 
crediting scheme credits should not be issued for abatement activities that would have occurred under a 
business-as-usual scenario — which raises questions as to whether ‘no-regrets’ opportunities should be 
considered  additional.  To  answer  this  question,  consideration  must  be  given  to  why  ‘no-regrets’ 
activities have not previously been adopted. Transaction costs, incomplete information, technology 
lock-in,  lack  of p u r c h a s i n g  p o w e r  a n d  l i m i t e d  t e c h n i c a l  e x p e r t i s e  h a v e  a l l  b e e n  p u t  f o r w a r d  a s  
explanations for the under exploitation of ‘no-regrets’ opportunities. These barriers may be reduced in 
the  future  and  abatement  activities  adopted  regardless  of  a  carbon  price. T h e r e f o r e ,  b a s e d  o n  t h e  
criteria of additionality, these abatement opportunities should not be credited. However, if there are 
hidden costs associated with ‘no-regret’ abatement activities and the introduction of a carbon price 
changed management decisions, then ‘no-regret’ opportunities may be considered to be additional. 
Clearly, decisions regarding the eligibility of ‘no-regrets’ abatement activities will have a large impact 
on the size of the offset market. Further research is required to fully understand the additionality of 
these abatement activities.  
In addition to ‘no-regrets’ abatement options, additional abatement activities exist that entail reducing 
output and trading off production against profits from emissions credits. In a perfect market, farmers 
will participate in abatement opportunities up to the point where the marginal benefit from doing so is 
equal to, or greater than, the marginal cost. Abatement opportunities will occur whenever the permit 
price lies above the marginal abatement cost curve, such that as the permit price increases so too does 
the total pool of abatement opportunities. This relationship is detailed in Figure 1.2.   
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Figure 1.2  
ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURAL ABATEMENT  
 
Source: ACG 2010 
ABARE has developed an aggregated Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curve as part of their GTEM 
general equilibrium-modeling framework (Ford et al 2009). The MAC curve is based on information 
from  the  Australia  Government  (2008)  CPRS  modeling  report,  the  United  States  Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA 2006), and analysis by the Energy Modeling Forum (DeAngelo et al. 2003). 
The MAC is disaggregated into methane from livestock and nitrous oxide from cropping, as illustrated 
in Figure 1.3.  
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Figure 1.3  
GTEM MARGINAL ABATEMENT COST CURVES IN AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURE, PERCENTAGE 
REDUCTIONS IN EMISSION INTENSITY 
 
Source: Ford et al. 2009, 
Applying this MAC curve, ABARE has investigated the impact of an agricultural offset scheme on the 
Australian agricultural sector. Due to data limitations, only Kyoto-compliant offsets were included in 
the analysis. At a carbon price of A$10
1 in 2011, emission reductions of 10.2 million Mt C02-e are 
expected in 2030 (Calford et al., 2010).  
Internationally,  research  is  also  being  conducted  to  assess  emissions  abatement  potential  and  cost 
within the agricultural sector. In December 2008, the United Kingdom Climate Change Committee 
(UKCCC) published research regarding the marginal cost of abatement in the agriculture, land use, and 
land use change (ALULUC) sectors. The research constructed a bottom up marginal cost curve that 
identified a technical abatement potential of 17.5 Mt CO2–e by 2020 at a carbon price of up to £100 per 
t CO2-e (Moran 2010). This MAC curve, as published in Campbell and Barber (2010), is presented in 
Figure 1.4. As with all MAC curves, care needs to be taken when drawing conclusions and interpreting 
the results. The abatement costs presented are averages with actual costs likely to be sensitive to site 
specific factors. Further, the MAC curve can be considered a snapshot of abatement opportunities and 
does not consider market feedback mechanisms that could alter the technology mix.  
                                                          
1
 This carbon price pathway is consistent with that used by the Commonwealth Treasury in their modelling of the CPRS (Treasury, 2010).  
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Figure 1.4  
UNITED KINGDOM MARGINAL ABATEMENT COST CURVE, AGRICULTURE AND LULUC SECTORS 
 
Source: Moran in Campbell and Barber 2010. 
However, the MAC curve is useful in detailing the range of options that are estimated to exist at little 
or  no  cost.  From  an  efficiency  perspective,  policies  should  guide  landholders  to  these  abatement 
options before exploiting more costly abatement activities.  
Currently detailed analysis of the scope and cost of greenhouse abatement in Australian (and global) 
agriculture is poor. The abatement potential of the agricultural and forestry sectors is a strategic issue 
requiring  comprehensive  research,  as  the  abatement  cost  curve  will  dictate  the  potential  profits 
available  at  a  given  offset  price.  The  processes  of  carbon  sequestration  in  agricultural  soils  and 
subsequent development of accounting methodologies are of particular importance. 
Transaction costs and market erosion 
The direct cost of emission abatement is only one of the costs that affect landholder’s decisions to 
participate in offset markets. Also important are the transaction costs of undertaking the investment 
and trading the permits (Stavins 1995). Monitoring, verification, enforcement and compliance can also 
place additional costs on both the regulator and landholders.  
Transaction costs increase the total cost of doing business and hence shrink the size of the market. The 
relationship is represented graphically in Figure 1.5. Where high transaction costs exist it is possible 
that the costs of production increase beyond what the market is willing to bear, resulting in a missing 
market.   
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Figure 1.5  
THE EFFECT OF TRANSACTION COSTS ON OFFSET MARKETS 
 
Source: Allen Consulting Group, 2011 
Coase (1937) first described the importance of transaction costs in his seminal paper ‘The Nature of the 
Firm’. H o w e v e r ,  o n l y  r e c e n t l y  have  transaction  costs  been  explicitly  considered  by  resource 
economists. By definition, transaction costs are the costs: 
Of arranging a contract to exchange property rights ex ante and monitoring and enforcing the contract ex post, as 
opposed to production costs, which are the costs of executing a contract. 
Matthews 1986, p. 906 
A  number  of  studies  have  aimed  to  define  and  categorise  transaction  costs,  so  as to structure the 
process of evaluating transaction costs related to natural resource policy options (McCann and Easter 
1999;  Thompson  1999).  Dudek  and  Wienar  (1996)  have  categorised  transaction  costs  related 
specifically to the creation of emission offsets in relation to the Kyoto Joint Implementation Scheme. 
Specifically, they identified six types of transaction costs including: search costs, negotiation costs, 
approval costs, monitoring costs, enforcement costs and insurance costs. For a detailed description of 
transaction costs in environmental markets see Dudek and Wienar (1996) and Cacho et al (2002). 
Transaction costs are difficult to measure and will be heavily reliant on scheme design. Based on the 
Canadian Alberta Trading Scheme experience, it has been estimated that transaction costs associated 
with evaluating and certifying offset credits could be between 65 and 85 per cent of the total costs 
(Fulton et al 2005). However, these costs are generally considered to be the lower bound to the total 
transaction costs that are expected to exist.  
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As a further indication, Kooten et al. (2002) showed that while around 75 per cent of farmers in the 
Western Canadian grain belt expressed a willingness to undertake carbon offset projects, very few 
indicated  that  they  would  actually  implement  abatement  projects  even  if  they  were  adequately 
compensated. The authors suggest that these results indicate the substantial hidden costs in undertaking 
offset projects.  
The  transaction  costs  associated  with  CFI  participation  could  be  substantial.  Reliable  monitoring, 
verification and reporting (MRV) are necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the system in delivering 
abatement objectives and  also to establish the bona  fides of the  allowances being traded. Poor or 
disparate estimation methods can lead to inefficiency and compliance risks (as resources are drawn to 
activities where emissions are being systematically under-estimated) and a loss of confidence in the 
allowances being traded by market participants. 
However, land-based abatement does not lend itself readily to MRV or trading. Difficulties generally 
relate to the: 
•  large number of dispersed and often small abatement sources; 
•  variability of actual abatement between sources, and over time from the same source; and 
•  paucity (and cost) of abatement measurement and verification techniques. 
This can result in substantial transaction costs and uncertainty within the trading system — imposing a 
significant (and possibly inequitable) burden on the emitters themselves, the regulator and potentially 
having an adverse affect on the efficiency and acceptability of the scheme. 
In this section, we review some of the key challenges relating to the trade of land-based offsets that are 
likely to increase the overall cost of the CFI scheme. Specifically, transaction costs are assessed in 
terms of producer costs, setting baselines and monitoring and enforcement.  
The cost of offsets participation: producer transaction costs 
For agricultural and forestry businesses to begin producing offset credits, they must first select the 
relevant CFI methodology, become a recognised offset entity (gaining an account with the registry) 
and have their project approved by a scheme administrator. Approval costs normally manifest in terms 
of  delays  and  uncertainty,  although  could  also  arise  as  out-of-pocket  costs  involved  in  compiling 
required information (Dudek and Wienar 1996).  
Transaction  costs  are  also  incurred  through  project  reporting.  Reporting  timeframes  are  yet  to  be 
determined but would likely occur annually. When reporting, landholders will be required to submit an 
audited report regarding their offset activity to the scheme administrator.  
In addition, a number of markets exist in which Australian landholders may sell carbon offset credits. 
Different markets allow different abatement activities, require different standards and attract different 
offset prices. Australian landholders will need to identify the market that is most attractive for their 
specific abatement activity. In doing so, they will incur further costs.  
Setting baselines and assessing additionality  
In order to issue credits, abatement must be measured against a certified emission baseline. In setting 
baselines the additionality principle is necessary because some abatement activities generating direct 
financial or other benefits may have been undertaken in the absence of climate change mitigation 
polices. In addition, some abatement activities are required under regulatory arrangements. In both 
cases, the decision to reduce emissions is not driven by carbon abatement and therefore should not be 
classified as an offset.   
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To test additionality under an offset scheme, abatement activities must be assessed against a business-
as-usual  baseline.  However,  establishing  this  baseline  is  subjective,  administratively  complex,  and 
requires an investigation into what outcomes would result in the absence of a proposed offset project. 
Baselines  are  required  for  different  abatement  activities  across  different  industries  and  should  be 
updated  to  reflect  changes  in  agricultural  production  process  or  government  policy.  As  such,  the 
transaction costs involved in setting baselines and assessing additionality may be high.  
The recent experience of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Executive Board highlights some 
of the potential risks and pitfalls that may prove insightful for regulators in Australia, including those 
related to the CFI and the NCOS.  
In 2010 the CDM Executive Board has been heavily criticised over delays in project registration and 
verification. Specific issues have included an over-burdensome administration process, difficulties in 
establishing  baselines,  and  lengthy  verification  processes.  Such  delays  increase  the  cost  of  offset 
projects and restrict the scope of the CDM market. 
Given the range of offset activities to be considered under the CFI and the geographical spread of 
Australia’s agricultural sector, there is a large risk that the regulator will face similar registration and 
verification delays as the CDM Executive Board. To avoid such operating delays, it will be important 
for the regulator to make projections of the likely volume of project registrations and ensure they have 
sufficient operational capacity. 
Monitoring and compliance  
The effectiveness of any market, in part, depends on the degree to which market participants comply 
with the terms of the contract they sign (Mihal and Fulton 2005). Compliance in the offset market 
cannot be assumed as offset producers have an incentive to over-report the carbon offsets created from 
their  emission  abatement  activities.  Governments  will  therefore  need  to  implement  measures  for 
monitoring and enforcement to ensure offset credits sold are the result of actual abatement activities.  
The economics of compliance can be credited to Becker’s (1968) seminal paper. Becker states that risk 
neutral agents will comply with the law only when the expected benefits from doing so are greater than 
the expected costs. The costs incurred from non-compliance will depend on the specific regulation. 
However, they generally involve penalties such as fines or imprisonment and social sanctions inflicted 
by one’s peers.  
A  number  of  studies  have  assessed  issues  surrounding  compliance  of  agricultural  producers  in 
environmental  programs.  For  example,  Giannakas  and  Fulton  (2000)  assess  misrepresentation  and 
cheating  in  policy  analysis  of  output  quotas  and  subsidies.  The  authors  show  the  impact  of  non-
compliance on the welfare effects of policy instruments and conclude that a mix of instruments can 
result in a more efficient outcome.  
Classen (2000) demonstrates that agricultural producer non-compliance is a substantial issue in United 
States conservation programs that aim to protect highly erodible land. Since policy inception, over 
11,000 producers have been cited for violations on approximately 281,000 acres with a total of nearly 
$16,000,000  in  denied  benefits.  Giannakas  and  Kaplan  (2005)  assess  the  determinants  of  non-
compliance and equilibrium enforcement policy in such conservational programs. They conclude that 
the policy enforcement depends on the size of the penalty and audit probability, which is determined, 
in turn, by the costs of monitoring producer compliance and the available budget. Specifically: 
The greater the monitoring costs and/or the lower the resources available to policy enforcers, the lower the audit 
probability and thus the lower the policy enforcement is expected to be. 
Giannakas and Kaplan (2005, p.32)  
  12 
Mihal and Fulton (2005) extend analysis of non-compliance to markets for land-based carbon offsets. 
Using comparative statics, they show that a lack of enforcement creates incentives for non-compliance 
through producers over-reporting levels of carbon abatement. They go on to determine that increasing 
the  audit  probability  as  well  as  the  penalty  applied  per  unit  of  non-compliance  can  increase 
compliance.  Finally,  they  indicate  that  increasing  carbon  prices  will  increase  the  total  pool  of 
participants and hence the costs of enforcement.  
These studies have significant implications for implementation of the CFI. Non-compliance will be an 
issue  so  long  as  monitoring  is  imperfect.  Given  the  disperse  nature  of  agricultural  businesses, 
monitoring and enforcement costs within Australia could be substantial indicating that non-compliance 
may present a considerable risk to the credibility of offset markets. As an example, Fulton et al. (2005) 
report Canadian based research that estimates the cost of monitoring and verification of individual 
agricultural abatement projects can be as high as C$18.56 per tonne of CO2-e.  
Reducing transaction costs through offset pools 
Pooling  refers  to  a  situation  where  landholders  group  together  to  sell  a  commodity. A u s t r a l i a n  
agriculture has a long history of collective investments, both compulsory and voluntarily. Wheat pools 
have been a major selling method in grain markets for years, and there are numerous cooperatives 
through which farmers procure inputs and sell produce (Campbell and Barber 2009). 
Given the correct incentives, offset pools can be designed to overcome many of the challenges that 
have been discussed in Section 1.6 of this report. Their application to the CFI is discussed below.  
Managing uncertainty 
Pooling can greatly reduce uncertainty surrounding the estimation of emission abatement from new 
technologies or practices. Diversification has long been a tool in managing the downside associated 
with risk. Offset pools present an opportunity for investors to purchase permits from a diverse range of 
emission activities. When emission reductions are sourced from a wide range of diverse activities, the 
pool  as  a  whole  exhibits  much  less  volatility  than  individual  farm  level  projects.  With  reduced 
uncertainty  investors  can  purchase  and  trade  credits  with  greater  assurance  regarding  the  actual 
emission reductions, reducing the need for discounts or trading ratios. In this way, offset pools will 
reduce  the  operating  costs  of  a  trading  scheme  and  ensure  offset  providers  receive  adequate 
compensation for their abatement activities.  
As with any investment portfolio, the choice of activities to include in the portfolio will depend on the 
objectives of the investors and their attitude to risks. However, given the great diversity in Australian 
agriculture (across regions, industries, farms within industries etc) there exists vast potential to create 
diverse offset pools.  
Reducing transaction costs 
Offset  pools  could  play  two r o l e s  i n  l o w e r i n g  t r a n s a c t i o n  c o s t s .  F i r s t l y ,  t h r o u g h  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  
education and training, offset pools could facilitate the participation of producers in offset markets, 
thereby  lowering  costs.  Second,  through  the  facilitation  of  project  aggregation, o f f s e t  p o o l s  c o u l d 
spread the fixed costs of market participation. 
Offsets represent a potential new income stream for the agricultural and forestry sectors. However, 
farmers are likely to face both administrative and managerial hurdles that may prove both financially 
costly  and  time-intensive.  The  accreditation  of  offsets  is  likely  to  represent  a  significant  cost  to 
farmers, who will likely benefit from education and training. Further, by selling into an offset pool, 
farmers’ will not need to navigate complex carbon markets.  
Offset pools may also reduce per unit transaction costs by achieving economies of scale. As discussed 
in Dudek and Wienar (1996), many of the transaction costs associated with emissions offset projects 
are fixed costs — costs that do not change with the level of output. For example, approval costs are 
unlikely to be affected by the size of the offset project.   
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It is possible that pools be designed to allow for small landholders to aggregate up similar abatement 
projects. Hence spreading the fixed transaction costs over a broader range of abatement projects and 
lowering the per unit cost of market participation.  
Aggregation of small abatement projects has proven successful in the Clean Development Mechanism 
via  the  Program  of  Activities a p p r o a c h .  Programmatic  CDM  groups  identical  emission  reduction 
projects  that  rely  on  the  same  technology  (and  hence  the  same  standards  for  monitoring  and 
verification) into one Program of Activities (PoA). Once a program has been established, additional 
CDM  projects  that  can  be  defined  within  the  PoA  can  be  added  without  undergoing  individual 
verification.  This  is  intended  to  augment  the  CDM’s  traditional  single-project  based  approach  by 
facilitating many small-scale projects to reduce emissions. 
PoA’s could be incorporated into offset pools as a means of reducing the transaction costs associated 
with small scale, dispersed abatement activities. Investors in offset pools would need to consider the 
total mix of abatement activities to ensure the pool provides the desired diversity and manages risk.  
Opportunities for co-regulation 
Offset pooling also provides an adequate  framework to introduce industry co-regulation to enforce 
offset production compliance. Co-regulation occurs when public and private actions and resources are 
co-ordinated  in  enforcement  efforts.  Co-regulation  aims  to  combine  the  predictability  of  binding 
legalisation  with  the  flexibility  of  self-regulated  approaches.  It  thus  involves  self-regulation  and 
legislation working together in a manner that mutually reinforces the other (Garcia Martinez et al. 
2007).  
It is in both the offset pool operator and regulator’s interest that offset producers adequately deliver on 
their contractual arrangements. Clearly, the Australian government requires compliance in order to 
accurately  report  on  national  emission  profiles.  Further,  an  offset  pool  operator  must  ensure  the 
environmental integrity of offset credits to attract investment from domestic and international permit 
buyers.  Under  such  conditions,  it  could  be  possible  for  the  pool  operator  to  offer  incentives  for 
compliance and function under a code of best practice. In this way, the threat of government sanctions 
would only be required as a last resort for farm operators that are caught dishonouring offset contracts.  
Regardless  of  the  mechanism  of  enforcement,  access  to  reliable  information  and  advice  is  a  vital 
component of any strategy aimed at increasing compliance (Garcia Martinez et al. 2007). As discussed 
above, offset pools provide a convenient channel to provide such information and advice to offset 
providers.  
Other challenges and potential to reduce barriers 
There are a number of additional challenges associated with the implementation of an emissions offset 
scheme. Specifically, uncertainty, the permanence criterion, irreversibility of offset investments and 
the supply response all present barriers to market participation. In some instances, it is may be possible 
to reduce these barriers through appropriate policy design.  
The cost of uncertainty 
The ability to confidently quantify pollution abatement is crucial for the success of a permit trading 
scheme  (Cantin,  Kalff,  and  Campbell  2005).  With  current  techniques  and  technologies,  emissions 
abated through changed agricultural processes or sequestration cannot be directly measured in a cost-
effective manner. Therefore estimation tools and methodologies must be developed to assess emission 
reductions from abatement activities. Inherent in such tools is uncertainty regarding the actual level of 
emission abatement and the potential to underestimate or overestimate actual emissions reductions.   
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Where land based emissions have been included into a permit trading scheme, a common approach has 
been to apply discount ratios to emission reductions or to only recognise a safe lower-bound estimate 
(Fulton et al. 2005). Discount ratios are applied to reduce the value of credits where there is uncertainty 
surrounding the exact level of emission reduction. However, as pointed out by Campbell and Barber 
(2010), this process only recognises the downside risk associated with estimation techniques and is 
therefore heavily biased against the agricultural sector. Such bias could potentially result in higher than 
necessary costs in delivering a given level of pollution abatement.  
Schemes should be designed to recognise both the downside and the upside when there is uncertainty 
surrounding emission measurement. This could be achieved by applying a specific ‘future value’ to 
each offset permit that explicitly recognised the value of any future upside (where abatement turns out 
to be greater than expected) (Campbell and Barber 2010). The ‘future value’ would be directly linked 
to the permit but could be traded separately.  These  ‘future values’  would retain a value based on 
market expectations surrounding the abatement potential of relatively new technologies or processes. 
In addition, they would encourage private sector research and development into the agricultural sector 
to  improve  measurement  techniques  and  accounting  methodologies.  Such  ‘future  values’  have  the 
potential to improve the efficiency of any offset trading scheme. Consideration should be given to their 
implementation in the CFI.  
Permanence  
The permanence criterion reflects concerns that carbon stored in biological sinks may be released via 
natural or anthropogenic processes. If carbon abatement is not permanent, it only reflects a temporary 
reduction in greenhouse emissions. As temporary emission reductions will not reduce global climate 
change over the long run, many argue that they should not be included in an environmentally sound 
offset scheme (Calford et al., 2010).  
However, as discussed by Campbell and Barber (2010), non-permanent sequestration should not be 
considered valueless. Early, non-permanent abatement could potentially push out the timing of any 
predicted ‘tipping points’ in the climate system and buy time in terms of developing cost effective, 
permanent sequestration technology. In this way, early cheap abatement could provide a transition to 
lower cost future technologies that are currently not technically available. Recognising this value, non-
permanent abatement could be specifically credited through fixed terms contracts.  
Non-permanence also represents a risk to landholders that have invested in sequestration activities. In 
the  instance  that  credited  abatement  is  released  back  to  the  atmosphere  carbon  credits  must  be 
surrendered.  A  key  challenge  for  any  offset-based  scheme  will  be  the  development  of  adequate 
insurance markets to protect landholders against unexpected events that emit sequestered carbon. As 
well as insurance markets, assurance factors can also be used to manage risks of carbon reversal to 
landholders. Assurance  factors account for the risk and magnitude of carbon sequestration reversal 
throughout the life of the project. They are calculated on the likely number and magnitude of reversal 
events and then applied annually, to avoid the project proponent incurring a large liability during a 
carbon reversal event. 
Irreversibility and ‘option values’ 
Offset producers must also make decisions with uncertainty regarding the price of offset permits over 
the life of the investment. Many offset projects are long-term investments and therefore must be made 
based on projections of permit price. However, the offset market is driven by a number of key supply 
and demand drivers that may not be known at the time of investment.  
By definition of the permanence criterion, sequestration and other abatement activities are irreversible 
investments. In making irreversible decisions under conditions of uncertainty, there may be an ‘option 
value’ in waiting for further information. The term ‘option value’ was first discussed by Arrow and 
Fisher  (1971)  and  refers  to  the  welfare  gain  or  benefit  associated  with  delaying  an  irreversible 
investment decision with uncertain payoffs.   
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Applied to agricultural offsets, it implies that producers will only engage in offset markets when the 
net present value of their investment exceeds the ‘option value’ of waiting for further information. 
Vercammen (2002) demonstrated that a farmer considering entering an irreversible offset project may 
require a premium of up to 60 to 70 per cent to compensate them for the option value. That is, the 
market price would need to be 60 to 70 per cent above the farmer’s cost before the farmer would have 
sufficient incentive to invest in irreversible carbon abatement projects.  
The supply response effect 
Over the long term, an offset scheme is likely to increase the returns to the agricultural and forestry 
sectors and therefore attract additional investment. This additional investment is likely to induce an 
increase  in  the  supply  of  agricultural  goods  and  may  therefore  result  in  an increase  in  emissions, 
relative to a situation where there was no offset-induced supply response (Calford et al., 2010). This 
supply response effect is witnessed in other activities that aim to reduce emissions such as increased 
energy efficiency.  
The size of the supply response effect will be dictated by the relative increase in agricultural returns 
and  changes  in  emission  intensity  within  the  sector.  In  the  instance  that  offset  credits  encourage 
investment in more  emission intensive activities such as intensive livestock production the supply 
response effect will be larger than if investment is directed into lower intensive agricultural activities.  
According to ABARE analysis, the size of the supply response effect could be significant. It has been 
estimated that the supply response may reduce total emission reductions by as much as 25 per cent 
(Calford et al., 2010). It is important for policy makers to understand the implications of the supply 
response effect in meeting international abatement commitments. Further research in this area should 
therefore be considered a priority. 
Key questions for Australian policy developers 
By facilitating the trade of offset permits, there is great potential for Australia to reduce the emission 
profile of the agriculture and forestry sectors. As detailed in this paper, much research identifies the 
scope  of  abatement  activities  that  could  be  harnessed  at  little  cost.  In  recognition  of  this,  the 
government is moving to legislate the Carbon Farming Initiative and establish a domestic market for 
agricultural offsets. 
For any market to be effective, there must be a number of agents that are willing to purchase a good at 
a  price  that  producers  are  willing  to  supply.  Currently  detailed  analysis  of  the  scope  and  cost  of 
greenhouse abatement in Australian (and global) agriculture is poor. Further research and development 
to better grasp how costs change with increased abatement will be essential to determine the potential 
profit that might be available through participation in offset arrangements. In  addition, research is 
required  to  fully  understand  the  scope  and  additionality  of  ‘no-regrets’  abatement  activities.  Such 
activities could be achieved at minimum or no cost and could possibly result in an increase in farm 
revenue. However, their adoption is hampered by the fact that there is inadequate analysis in relation to 
the quantity of abatement that could be generated by these activities and whether these practices meet 
international eligibility criteria. 
While  it  is  possible  that  a  wide  range  of  abatement  activities  exist  at  little  or  no  cost,  there  is 
considerable risk that the transaction costs associated with the scheme will be high, eroding the market 
and diminishing the effectiveness of the policy tool. As has been discussed, the costs of monitoring, 
enforcement, verification and the option values and risk premiums required by farmers may be more 
than  what  the  market  is  willing  to  pay  for  agricultural  offsets  — p a r t i c u l a r l y  g i v e n  t h e  l a c k  o f  a  
domestic compliance market. Currently, there is little research that aims to understand or quantify the 
transaction costs associated with agricultural offset markets. Such research should be seen as a priority 
for policy makers.   
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Given these risks, offset schemes must be designed to limit transaction costs and increase incentives 
for market participation. Pooling represents an opportunity to reduce the transaction costs associated 
with an offset trading scheme. Specifically, through diversification, the provision of information, the 
aggregation of small-scale abatement activities and through retailing offset permits, offset pools could 
reduce the costs to abatement activities to landholders. Further, given the likely cost of monitoring and 
verification and constrained government budgets, non-compliance should be seen as a substantial risk 
to the effectiveness of the CFI. Offset pools represent an opportunity to implement public and private 
partnerships, reducing the costs of monitoring and verification while increasing compliance.  
While pooling offers large potential to reduce the operating costs of the CFI, it is currently unclear 
what role they  will play. Research is needed to better understand the best institutional structure of 
offset pools or their impact on the offset market. 
It  is  clear  that  the  Australian  government  is  keen  to  harness  cheap  emission  reductions  from  the 
agricultural sector. However, there is a risk that without clever design, substantial transaction costs 
could erode the benefits of market participation to landholders and shrink the offset market. This paper 
has identified a number of challenges to the implementation and operation of the CFI and has proposed 
some potential solutions. Further research is required to understand what role offset pooling and other 
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